

Pakistan-India Equation Determinants, Dynamics and the Outlook

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Abstract

[Though it has been a longtime since 1947, both Pakistan and India couldn't steer the trajectory of their relations in the right direction. Even in the twenty first Century, this relationship is, by and large, determined through the prism of history. The nuclearization of South Asia, triggered by India and the strategic arms race alongside perpetual state of conflict, have aggravated the threat of war that may no more remain limited or restricted to convectional arsenal; but has strong indicators of escalation of any future conflict to nuclear plane, leading to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD.) The assumption that economic interdependence can lead to normalization of relations, has failed in this particular case. The determinants and dynamics of bilateral relations, holdout that normalization of relations is a complex phenomenon intricately embedded in the resolution of the core disputes. Be it the domain of military and strategic relationship, or either political or economic dimension, there has been no substantial improvement. The resolution of the core disputes including Kashmir is the key to the betterment of relations, which remains as an unfulfilled agenda in the United Nations. Bilateralism has failed so far, and there is a dire need for a sustainable conflict resolution mechanism assisted by third party mediation in order to restraint the region from arm race and the threat of nuclear war, and to ensure a prosperous and peaceful future for South Asia. – *Author*]

Introduction

Pakistan-India relations are determined by the history of mistrust, ideological differences, and perpetual conflicts. The strained political and strategic relations have overshadowed the benefits of cooperation in every aspect of relations. A positive and result-oriented engagement between the two states has been missing since inception. Potential of economic cooperation remained untapped whereas broad-based development of the two people also suffered.

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Ironically, in the list of largest arms importers, India and Pakistan rank at number one and seven¹ respectively, whereas both lie at lowest rungs with regards to human development and poverty reduction.² Both countries are suffering from internal instability;

Since Partition in 1947, the mistrust and hostility have aggravated, resulting in three full scale wars between the two states, leading to the nuclearization of South Asia.

Pakistan is engaged in military operation against militancy in FATA; India is facing many separatist movements in its North-Eastern States.³ Kashmir is a disputed territory and a core conflict between India and Pakistan. At the time of partition of the Sub-Continent, the Muslim majority state of Kashmir was annexed by India with the connivance of departing British entities and individuals, like the Chairman Boundary Commission

and the first Governor General of India.⁴ The United Nations had declared it as disputed territory way back in 1948⁵, and the status is unchanged. The other unresolved territorial issues include water, Sir Creek and Siachen.⁶

Since Partition in 1947, the mistrust and hostility in the backdrop of these issues, have only aggravated, resulting in three full scale wars between the two states, leading to the nuclearization of South Asia.⁷ The relations in twenty first century, by and large, remain under the shadow of history. Though, nuclear deterrence has minimized the possibility of full scale war, it could not prevent the two states from indulging into low intensity crisis.⁸ In the emerging scenario, India has

¹ SIPRI Year Book, 2016- Summary, "Armaments, Disarmament and International Security," 2016, <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB16-Summary-ENG.pdf> (Accessed March 14, 2017.)

² Human Development Report 2015, United Nations Development Program, 2015, p.48-49
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf (Accessed March 15, 2017)

³ Conflict in Northeast India: Issues, Causes and Concern, *Heinrich Boll Stiftung*, 2009, <https://in.boell.org/2009/02/28/conflict-northeast-india-issues-causes-and-concern> (Accessed December 31, 2016.)

⁴ Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967): 295-305.

⁵ See "Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1948" *United Nations*, available at, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/51\(1948\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/51(1948))

⁶ See details in the Section 2.3 & 3.6

⁷ India nuclearization was followed by that of Pakistan; though deterring China was also of the factor of Indian Nuclearizaion.

⁸ Adil Sultan, "South Asian Stability- Instability Paradox: Another Perspective" *IPRI Journal XIV*, no. 1(2014):22

started terming Pakistan as the supporter of terrorism; often accusing it of sponsoring terrorist activities in India; while Pakistan names India for meddling by its Intelligence agency to destabilize Pakistan. Pakistan is promptly blamed for any incident of terrorism in India, within hours of occurrence, even prior to preliminary investigations.⁹ This often leads to immediate disruptions of any ongoing political communications.

Though political and diplomatic efforts to normalize relations have continued albeit with interruptions, these have, by and large, remained inconclusive. The urge for improvement of economic relations has been stressed from both sides and there has been gradual increase in the trade volume.¹⁰ Some strategists argue that enhanced economic cooperation could contribute towards decrease in political tensions. However, India-Pakistan present a complicated case, where this notion may not hold ground. The history of relations illustrate that economic relations have not lessened the political rivalry but the latter has deteriorated or disrupted the economic activities. Though a number of Track-II initiatives are functional, any worthwhile progress is not visible.

Determining Factors in India-Pakistan Relations

The relations between India and Pakistan can largely be determined by the history, ideology, culture and geography. The history of animosity dates back to the inception of very idea of partition on the basis of discriminatory treatment of Muslim minority by the Hindu majority; foundation of Muslim League to protect the rights of the Muslims which Indian National Congress—a Hindu dominated party had failed to address.

Roots of Animosity: Living together through centuries, both communities developed some similarities in food, culture and lifestyles but within these domains, there remained defining dissimilarities that had always been contentious between the two communities from united to divided India. They don't even share the same narrative of history; each side has its own heroes and villains, which are conflicting i.e.,

⁹ For details see, Arundhati Roy, *Field Notes on Democracy: Listening to Grosshoopers*, (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2009); Arundhati Roy, *13 December, a Reader: The Strange Case of the Attack on the Indian Parliament*, (Penguin Books India, 2006); Saleem Zafar and Awais Bin Wasi, *Terrorism in India: Method in Madness? Policy Perspectives*, 7, no 2 (2010); Ashish Khetan, "In the words of a Zealot," *Tehlaka*, issue 2 Vol. 8 January 15, 2011.

¹⁰ Ranjit Singh Ghuman & Davinder Kumar Madaan, "Indo-Pakistan Trade Cooperation and SAARC," *Peace and Democracy in South Asia* 2 no. 1 & 2 (2006), http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collections/journals/pdsa/pdf/pdsa_02_01_04.pdf (Accessed April 6, 2016.)

heroes of one community are villains of the other community and vice versa. They observe different festivities from religious through cultural to social domains. For example, Hindus worship cows and Muslims eat beef.¹¹ Islam's belief system of human equality is totally different from caste-based Hinduism. Even though living together for centuries, the integration between the two communities remained untenable— at best limited to patchy convergences.¹² Hindi was considered the language of Hindus and Urdu 'was branded as the language of Muslims'.¹³ Ideological differences deepened the hatred and led to the political and economic marginalization of Muslims by Hindus during Raj days. Demand for a separate homeland for Muslims became inevitable in the wake of ruthless Congress rule in 1937 and the consequent efforts to implement Hindu hegemony over minorities. Hence, the "two nation theory"¹⁴ became the ideological foundation for the partition.¹⁵ Foreseeing the marginalization of Muslims and continuous conflict between the two communities, Muslim leadership demanded a separate homeland for Muslims as part of decolonization process for Indian sub-Continent,—a country consisting of Muslim majority areas of India. Hindu dominated political party Congress was not in favor of the creation of Pakistan; it wanted to rule entire India (Akhand Bharat)¹⁶ which was once ruled by Muslims before colonization by the United Kingdom.

¹¹ In recent years, the victimization of Muslims on selling and eating beef in India has been intensified, especially in Modi regime. See, "Beef row: Where it is illegal and what the law says," *Indian Express*, July 27, 2016 (Accessed April 21, 2017.) <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/beef-madhya-pradesh-video-cow-vigilantes-gau-rakshaks-2938751/>

¹² Chaudhary Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1967): 1-2.

¹³ Shahid M. Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000): 16.

¹⁴ For further details see: Khurshid Ahmed, "Pakistan: Vision and Reality, Past and Future," *The Muslim World* 96, no. 2 (2006)

¹⁵ Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*: 15-16.

¹⁶ Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 19-21.

Unfair Partition Plan: Anticipating the difficulty in retaining control over subcontinent and indispensable partition of India, the British government decided to transfer the power to the local representatives through a "Partition Plan".¹⁷ The hasty and unjust division of India by the British representatives, became a factor for a state of perpetual conflict between the two successor dominions/republics.¹⁸ While the partition plan was in favor of India, the Congress remained dissatisfied owing to its obsession with "Akhand Bharat" but ultimately accepted Pakistan with an optimistic approach towards its reunification with India. Muslim League's leadership found the partition plan discriminatory but decided to accept the plan as a 'last resort'.¹⁹ What was left unsettled by the British Representatives, was the future of Princely states. Under the formula, 564 princely states were to join either India or Pakistan on the basis of Partition Formula. This happened with all ease but with the exception of three states: states of Junagadh and Hyderabad were being ruled by Muslims though the majority population was Hindu, while Kashmir was being ruled by Hindu Raja, the majority of the population was Muslim. The ruler of the state of Junagadh decided to join Pakistan but India forcibly occupied it claiming it the violation of principles of partition (geographic contiguity and the religious majority). But the same right was denied by India to Kashmiris and Pakistan in case of Kashmir. To create the geographic contiguity between Kashmir and India, the Muslim majority district of Gurdaspur was mischievously handed over to India. Hyderabad's Muslim ruler decided to keep its state independent, but India forcibly annexed it in 1948.²⁰ Announcement of the partition of sub-continent while disregarding the laid down principles of partition gave birth to territorial disputes. India, thus embarked upon unilaterally annexing the states, invoking the partition formula where it fitted its ambition and disregarding it wherever it came in the way of its hegemonic objectives.

After the partition, India emerged as successor state, possessing large mass of geography and almost all the important assets and logistics.

A History of (Troubled) Relations (1947-1999): Immediately after the partition, communal riots erupted and around a million Muslims

¹⁷ Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*.

¹⁸ Ahmed, "Pakistan: Vision and Reality, Past and Future": 366

¹⁹ Abdul Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy 1947-2012*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013): 19.

²⁰ Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 276-299.

were slaughtered within few weeks.²¹ A large number of refugees migrated from both sides. Due to the continued communal riots, both countries were at the verge of war in 1950-51.²² Approximately, one and half million lives were lost in deadly riots.²³ After the partition, India emerged as successor state, possessing large mass of geography and almost all the important assets and logistics of undivided India which were supposed to be shared between India and Pakistan. Pakistan emerged as geographically vulnerable weak state with lack of economic and military assets. To further weaken Pakistan, India deprived it of the assets of British India. In 1948, India cutoff the water flows from Sutlej and Ravi to the irrigation canals, damaging Pakistan's agriculture, and ultimately forcing the later to pay the charges for provision of water.²⁴

In consequence of the Indian efforts to accede Kashmir to India, the Kashmir war (1947-1948) erupted. Indian Army occupied large part of Jammu and Kashmir while Pakistani tribesmen liberated the remaining part of Kashmir called Azad Kashmir. India took the matter to the United Nations and resultant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolutions of 17 January 1948 and 20 January 1948, asking for ceasefire between India and Pakistan and later on the Resolution 21 April 1948, calling for plebiscite in Kashmir under the UN supervision.²⁵ UNSC passed several subsequent resolutions to reaffirm the UN commitment to plebiscite.²⁶ But later, predicting the loss of whole Kashmir in case of Plebiscite under UN supervision, as the Muslims of Jammu Kashmir were in favor of accession to Pakistan, India, incrementally, retreated from its own commitment and also began to lay its claim over Azad Jammu and Kashmir. V.P. Menon, Secretary of Indian Ministry of States at the time of partition, accepted later in 1964: that, "as for plebiscite, we were absolutely, absolutely dishonest."²⁷

The two countries also fought two other full scale wars in 1965 and 1971. While the two countries have their own versions about the initiation and conclusion of war 1965; Indian side claims that the war

²¹ Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 18.

²² Amin, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 29.

²³ Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk, Nor a Dove*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015):78.

²⁴ Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 17-18.

²⁵ "Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1948" *United Nations*, [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/51\(1948\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/51(1948)) (Accessed March 12, 2017.)

²⁶ Available at www.un.org

²⁷ A. G. Noorani, "Plebiscite in Kashmir – Stillborn or Killed?" *Criterion Quarterly* 11, no. 4, December 2016. <http://www.criterion-quarterly.com/plebiscite-kashmir-stillborn-killed/> (Accessed March 12, 2017.)

erupted after the launch of 'Operation Gibraltar' by Pakistan whereas the latter maintains that the operation was launched in response to the Indian occupation of Kargil heights.²⁸ In the war of 1971, India played a substantive role towards disintegration of Pakistan.²⁹ This further deepened the sense of insecurity in Pakistan. In 1969, the dispute over Rann of Kutch was resolved with the exception of Sir Creek. India, later on, claimed the area as a part of Indian maritime boundary, though, historically it was considered as a Part of Pakistan's province of Sindh. Later, in 1984, another territorial dispute emerged when India occupied the Siachen Glacier located at the north of Kashmir, violating the Shimla Agreement, which maintains, "Pending the final settlement of any of the problems between the countries, neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation"³⁰ Since then, India and Pakistan are in a state of conflict at world's highest battlefield.³¹

To settle the water issues between India and Pakistan, Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) was signed between both the countries with the mediation of World Bank. It was a significant and unprecedented treaty that divided the rivers between the two countries. India started violating the treaty systematically since the 1970s, by building dams on three western rivers allocated to Pakistan under the treaty. Pakistan has continuously been protesting against these violations by bringing its cases to neutral experts and International court of arbitration.³²

At political & diplomatic levels, the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) and Simla agreement of 1972 could be considered as significant developments. Lahore Declaration announced during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Pakistan, in 1999, was important and comprehensive, covering entire range of issues between India and Pakistan and showing a resolve to settle all issues including Kashmir through peaceful means.³³ Shimla Agreement and IWT remained subject to violations and misinterpretations by Indian side, whereas,

²⁸ Khalid Rahman, "A war lost in Tashkent," *The Week*, August 23, 2015, <http://www.theweek.in/theweek/cover/INDO-PAK-WAR-1965-A-war-lost-in-Tashkent.html> (Accessed March 09, 2017.),

²⁹ Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has officially accepted the Indian involvement in supporting rebellion in East Pakistan, in 2016. See: "'Modi's remarks in B'desh aimed at fanning hatred against Pak' The *Indian Express*, June 10, 2015 <http://indianexpress.com/article/world/neighbours/modis-remarks-in-bdesh-aimed-at-fanning-hatred-against-pak/> (Accessed December 13, 2016.)

³⁰ "Simla Agreement," *Stimson Center*, Jul 2, 1972, Accessed April 19, 2017, Accessed March 19, 2017, <https://www.stimson.org/simla-agreement>

³¹ Sattar, *Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, 211.

³² Shafqat KakaKhel, "The Indus Water Treaty: Negotiation, Implementation, Challenges and Future Prospects," *Pakistan Horizon* 67, no.1 (2014): 44-51.

³³ *Ibid.*, 243-244.

Lahore Declaration was never implemented.³⁴ After the nuclear tests by both the countries in 1998, the nature of strategic relationship changed and the danger of nuclear war restrained the countries to engage in any serious military clash.

At economic level, Pakistan and India started with significant bilateral trade. In 1948-49 the share of India in Pakistan's import was 23.6 to 50.6 percent whereas Pakistan's share in India's import and export in 1951- 52, was 2.2 to 1.1 percent respectively. Until the 1965 war, bilateral trade relations were smooth because the leadership of both countries kept economic relations separate from politics.³⁵ After 1965 war the trade was suspended. It was resumed after the Simla Agreement but in a limited way. These relations further deteriorated during the following years.³⁶

While nuclear deterrence has constrained the direct military confrontation, both countries have often accused each other about supporting non-state actors and state actors for carrying out terrorist activities in each other's territories.

Relations Post 2000

It is rightly said that the history of Pak- India relations is 'replayed daily' in the form of flag raising and lowering parades at Wahga border crossing between Lahore and Amritsar.³⁷ It is also demonstrated through heightened emotions during sports meets, media stories, political interactions and statements, border skirmishes, and at the highest battlefield of the world.

The overt nuclearization in 1998 and post 9/11 developments, continue to overshadow the trajectory of Pakistan-India relations. The relations between the two countries have remained unstable and uncertain, though not unpredictable. While nuclear deterrence has constrained the direct military confrontation, both countries have often accused each other about supporting non-state actors and state actors for carrying out terrorist activities in each other's territories. Frequency of low intensity conflicts has increased³⁸, at the same time there have

³⁴ Kasuri, *Neither a Hawk*, 418-422.

³⁵ Ghuman & Madaan, "Indo-Pakistan Trade," 72

³⁶ *Ibid.* 71-72

³⁷ V. Bruce J. Tolentino, *At the India-Pakistan Border: History, Replayed Daily*, May 27, 2009 <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2009/05/27/at-the-india-pakistan-border-history-replayed-daily/> (Accessed April 3, 2016.)

³⁸ Adil Sultan, "South Asian Stability-Instability Paradox"

also been enhanced efforts for normalizing political relations and improving economic relations.³⁹ This effort has occasionally come about through commitments by the political leadership and the business communities from both sides. Apart from this, track II initiatives have also taken firm roots.⁴⁰ However, all such initiatives remain prone to disruption, as India often calls off any ongoing talks on the pretext of sporadic violent occurrences and blames Pakistan for such happenings; even though some of such events have been proven as false flag operations, beyond doubt, conducted by Indian agencies.⁴¹

Military and Strategic Relations: India has numerical superiority over Pakistan in conventional military means which over the years have ranged between 3:1 to 5:1; India also has exclusive capabilities like nuclear submarines, air craft carriers and a fairly advanced space weaponization program. Indian defence spending is seven times that of Pakistan.⁴² In 2016, it planned to pump in US\$ 150 billion over a period of next ten years under Force Modernization/Upgradation program. And even a greater sum is earmarked for "Make in India" initiative to achieve "Sovereign Defence"⁴³ capability. After nuclearization in 1998, way of ascertaining India-Pakistan balance of power went a qualitative change. Now it is composite nuclear-conventional balance of force. Consequently it has played a significant role in avoiding a war. Nevertheless, the threat of eruption of war emanated several times. In 2001, Indian parliament was attacked by some militants and India blamed Pakistan for this attack. These allegations, though remained unproved,⁴⁴ brought two nations to military standoff during 2001-2002.⁴⁵ Though, this incident did not give the two nuclear states, any rationale, to go to war, immediate and total mobilization of troops by the larger nuclear weapon state against the smaller nuclear weapon

³⁹ Michael Kugelman, "The Pakistan-India Trade Relationship: Prospects, Profits, and Pitfalls" in *Pakistan-India Trade: What Needs to be Done, What Does it Matter*, (Wilson Centre, Washington DC, 2013)

⁴⁰ Samir Ahmad, Track-Two Dialogue in the India-Pakistan Context, ISAS Brief no. 408, February 23, 2016, <http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/ISAS%20Reports/ISAS%20Brief%20No.%20408.%20Track-Two%20Dialogue%20in%20the%20India-Pakistan%20Context.pdf> (Accessed April 4, 2016.)

⁴¹ For details see: Arundhati Roy, *13 December, a Reader: The Strange Case of the Attack on the Indian Parliament*, (Penguin Books India, 2006).

⁴² "India's military budget 7 times more than Pakistan" *Pakistan Today*, February 2, 2017, <http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/02/02/indias-military-budget-7-times-more-than-pakistan/> (Accessed February 6, 2017.)

⁴³ Iain Marlow & Nc Bipindra, "India Lifts Veil on Army as Modi Moves to Spend \$150 Billion," *Bloomberg*, July 29, 2016 <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-28/india-lifts-veil-on-army-as-modi-prepares-to-spend-150-billion> (Accessed March 28, 2017.)

⁴⁴ Roy, *Field Notes on Democracy*, 103-106

⁴⁵ Zafar & Wasi, "Terrorism in India"

state without proper evidence does indicate that irrationality persisted in that case and the deterrence stability was at the verge of its failure. This is indeed an alarming strategic environment.

Though India failed to intimidate Pakistan by its Operation Parakram (Valour) started on December 15, 2001 in response to Parliament attack of 2001,⁴⁶ it unleashed its doctrinal thought process in dangerous directions. India crafted a strategy of blitzkrieg⁴⁷ style to wage a limited war within Pakistani territory without invoking a counterattack, if an incident of (alleged) terrorism occurred, again. Notionally the concept is known as "Cold Start Doctrine" (CSD).⁴⁸ Though India has reorganized its military in line with this new doctrine, there are serious logistic and infrastructure related deficiencies. It proved a mere ambitious document which largely underestimates the capabilities of Pakistan's conventional forces' ability to retaliate back.⁴⁹ Practically, it could not be implemented when Mumbai attack⁵⁰ occurred in 2008, even though allegations were made against Pakistan about supporting that attack. However, adoption of such notion of military adventurism by India pushed Pakistan to take counter-measures and owing to its relatively limited economic resources to develop equitable conventional military power to create a favorable balance of power, Pakistan opted to develop battlefield nuclear weapons "Al-Nasr" commonly called as Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW).⁵¹

When the Uri attack⁵² occurred in September 2016, India while blaming Pakistan, claimed that it has conducted surgical strike of which Pakistani authorities weren't aware of and were informed by the Indian

⁴⁶ Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal, "Lost opportunities in Operation Parakram," Indian Defence Review, December 13, 2011. <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/lost-opportunities-in-operation-parakram/> (Accessed March 15, 2017.)

⁴⁷ Blitzkrieg is a military tactic which means "Lightning war". It refers to surprise and speedy offensive attack by the land and air forces with close coordination to disorganize enemy forces.

⁴⁸ According to this doctrine, Indian Strike Corps would be divided into eight (Integrated Battle field Groups). These groups would be supported by Air and Naval forces. They will launch multiple strikes in Pakistan and will complete their mission within 72-96 hours including the time of their mobilization.

⁴⁹ Walter C. Ladwig III, A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine, *International Security* 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007-08): 158-190.

⁵⁰ A militant attack occurred in Mumbai, India in 2008. Approximately 52 people died including foreigners and around 100 got injured.

⁵¹ The purpose of developing TNW was to plug-in the hole which came to surface after emergence of CSD. General (R) Khalid Kidwai, Former Director General Strategic Plan Division, called these battlefield nuclear weapons as 'weapons of Peace' if 'sanity prevails'. For details see, A Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai by Peter Lavoy at Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference 2015, held on March 23, 2015. <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/03230315carnegieKIDWAI.pdf> (Accessed March 28, 2016.)

⁵² A militant attack in Indian Army camp in Uri, which took the lives of 18 soldiers.

Director General Military Operations (DGMO) that such strike had happened. Interestingly it was a unique case that the Indian Military asserted of having conducted the strike while Pakistan's military denied such occurrence. Official claims by Indian military raised many eyebrows within strategic community of India. Pointed questions were raised inside India asking for providing solid proof of such strike.⁵³ It seems to be an attempt to prove that Indian military was able to implement its Cold Start Doctrine without invoking Pakistan's response but ground realities did not support such a proposition.

Apart from these developments, tensions at the Line of Control (LoC) remain an issue of deep concern. The exchange of artillery fire intensified in 2014 after the BJP led government took charge in India; there has been record number of cease fire violations since 2014.⁵⁴ Both the countries blame each other for the violations of LoC ceasefire accord. United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was appointed in 1949 by the United Nations Security Council to monitor the cease fire line.⁵⁵ Pakistan made a complaint against Indian violations of cease fire agreement. UNMOGIP visited Pakistani areas affected by shelling of Indian Border Security Forces (BSF).⁵⁶ India though still hosting UNMOGIP strangely maintains that the mission has become irrelevant after the Simla Agreement. According to Indian interpretation, Simla Agreement calls for bilateral resolution of the disputes without any third-party mediation and because since then cease fire line UNMOGIP was mandated to monitor does not exist as it was abolished and renamed as Line of Control,

Deterrence stability has held the sway as the leaderships of both countries showed restraint in not letting escalation of low intensity conflicts get out of control.

⁵³ "Sanjay Nirupam Questions Surgical Strikes, Congress Distances Itself," *News18.com*, October 4, 2016. <http://www.news18.com/news/politics/sanjay-nirupam-questions-surgical-strikes-congress-distances-itself-1298605.html> (Accessed March 14, 2017.) Tashkeel Ahmed Farooqui, "Delhi CM 'questions' authenticity of India's 'surgical strikes' in Pakistan," *The Express Tribune*, October 3, 2016. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1192809/new-delhi-cm-questions-authenticity-indias-surgical-strikes-pakistan/> (Accessed March 14, 2017.)

⁵⁴ *Reuters*, India, Pakistan border chiefs agree to lower tensions in Kashmir, Sep 11, 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-pakistan-idUSKCN0RB1P220150911> (Accessed, March 29, 2016.)

⁵⁵ "Observing the ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir," *United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan*, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmogip/> Accessed, March 22, 2017.)

⁵⁶ Mateen Haider, "Pakistan files complaint with UNMOGIP over 'Indian ceasefire violations'," *Dawn*, July 17, 2015, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1195076> (Accessed March 06, 2017.)

hence there was no requirement of the UN observers.⁵⁷ However, Pakistan does not subscribe this Indian view. Islamabad insists that opening text of Simla agreement refers to the UN Charter and indicates commitments by parties to settle all matters in line with the UN Charter.⁵⁸ Through such untenable gimmicks, India wants to keep its atrocities in Indian occupied Kashmir away from international focus. The LoC and Working Boundary (WB) skirmishes lingered till September 2015, when Director General of Pakistan.

DG, Border Security Forces of India and they jointly agreed to end the cease fire violations.⁵⁹ But, this understanding was short-lived and off and on border skirmishes have continued ever since.

In the overall context, deterrence stability has held the sway as the leaderships of both countries showed restraint in not letting escalation of low intensity conflicts get out of control. However, sustainability of deterrence stability is questionable when the policies of one state, are creating security dilemma for the other. India's rapid modernization and increase in its military and strategic assets is contributing to intensification of security concerns in Pakistan and compelling it for a reciprocal response. Indian has operationalized its nuclear submarines⁶⁰ and development of its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) is at final stages.⁶¹ Such measures contribute towards erosion of the strategic balance and have compelled Pakistan to go for more economical options like multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV)⁶², for maintaining credible minimum deterrence. India aspires for regional dominance and global prestige that could not be attained without strengthening and demonstrating its military muscle. But all these military and strategic developments have a direct impact on Pakistan's security owing to the nature of relations, type of military inventory and India's proneness to threaten use of force against its neighbours. India has also accelerated its efforts to encircle Pakistan

⁵⁷ Bharat Karnad, "Demilitarization of LoC: Negative Strategic Ramifications," in *India Pakistan Relations: Courting Peace from the Corridors of War*, ed. P.M.Kamath (New Delhi: VPM's Centre for International Studies, 2005): 275-276

⁵⁸ "Simla Agreement," Stimson Center.

⁵⁹ *Reuters*, "India, Pakistan border chiefs agree to lower tensions."

⁶⁰ Manu Pubby, India's first nuclear submarine INS Arihant ready for operations, passes deep sea tests, February 23, 2016. <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/indias-first-nuclear-submarine-ins-arihant-ready-for-operations-passes-deep-sea-tests/articleshow/51098650.cms> (Accessed March 29, 2016.)

⁶¹ "BMD in final stages of development," *The Hindu*, August 03, 2015, accessed, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/andhra-pradesh/bmd-in-final-stages-of-development/article7493545.ece>

⁶² Ali Osman, "What you need to know about Pakistan's Ababeel ballistic missile," *Dawn*, Jan 25, 2017. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1310463/what-you-need-to-know-about-pakistans-ababeel-ballistic-missile> (Accessed January 30, 2017.)

following the policy of Chanakya (Kutilya) of encircling the enemy by making alliance with enemy's neighbours/allies.⁶³ Indian investment in Iran's Chabahar port, its increasing engagement in Afghanistan and its efforts to build strong relations with Saudi Arabia and UAE, are aimed at exerting diplomatic pressure on Pakistan.

An important element in the strategic arena is the growing India-US relations. Though, on the face of it, the Indo-US Strategic partnership may not be Pakistan specific, it actually has far reaching impact on Pakistan's security concerns. The partnership allows India to enhance its military and strategic capability while denying same to Pakistan. For example, US

Efforts for resolving the disputes have been made, off and on, by the political leadership of both countries, but such efforts had been sabotaged.

procured NSG waiver has enabled India to increase its fissile material stockpiles by entering into Uranium procurement and other nuclear technology transfer arrangements with nearly a dozen countries.⁶⁴ While the US played positive role in deescalating tensions in case of Kargil crisis, 2001 military stand off and earlier in the aftermath of Mumbai attacks 2008, it also aggravates strategic rivalry while promoting its own interests in the region. Pakistan has objected discriminatory Indo-US nuclear deal whereas Indian opposition to the delivery of mere six F/16s to Pakistan by its strategic partner—was obliged and the US blocked the delivery through a negative vote by Chair of Congressional Committee on Foreign affairs.⁶⁵ India's ambition to join nuclear elite and its unhindered journey toward achieving that goal, would continue to keep the region in turmoil.

To minimize the impact of strategic strain, Pakistan has repeatedly proposed to negotiate "Strategic Arms Restraint Regime" with India. Recently, Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA) has, once again offered India to negotiate on the proposal, however

⁶³ "Chanakya's Arthashastra relevant to understand strategic culture: Shivshankar Menon," *India Today*, October 9, 2013. <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/chanakya-arthashastra-relevant-to-understand-strategic-culture-shivshankar-menon/1/313809.html> (Accessed March 22, 2017.)

⁶⁴ Zafar Khan, "The changing Contours of minimum deterrence in South Asia," *Policy Perspectives* 13, no.1 (2016): 82-83.

⁶⁵ "Anger in India as US approves sale of eight F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan," *The Guardian*, February 13, 2016. <http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/feb/13/anger-in-india-as-us-approves-sale-of-eight-f16-fighter-jets-to-pakistan> (Accessed March 6, 2016.)

India does not appear interested.⁶⁶ A broader understanding on strategic restraint by both states is pre-requisite for robust deterrence stability in South Asia.

Political and Diplomatic Ties - The Fragility of Peace Process:

Ties in political and diplomatic arenas have seen frequent ups and down but hopes of any break-through have not yet been given-up. Efforts for resolving the disputes have been made, off and on, by the political leadership of both countries, but such efforts had been sabotaged either by terrorist attacks or due to the unwillingness of India to talk on Kashmir or make it a priority item on agenda. India wants to talk on terrorism only and that too as interpreted by her.⁶⁷ This attitude is the underlying cause for the current stalemate in negotiations.

To end the political and diplomatic impasse caused by Kargil conflict, President Musharraf had visited India in 2001 on the invitation of the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. The talks were held at Agra, so the event came to be known as "Agra Summit". At that time, Kashmir was the focus of the summit. Former Foreign Minister Mehmud Kasuri writes in his book that the draft agreement on the resolution of Kashmir was agreed. But, at the last moment Indian leadership refused to sign the agreement. Though, Prime Minister Vajpayee used to be the advocate of peace and resolution of Kashmir, but could not reciprocate to the proposal for the peaceful resolution of Kashmir, even bilaterally, for he could not go against the political rhetoric of BJP on Kashmir.⁶⁸ Whereas Musharraf probably because of being a part of military establishment, was able to show some flexibility toward the resolution of Kashmir that neither of civilian leadership in either side of the borders has ever soon shown. Mentioning President Musharraf's proposal on Kashmir, Shamshad Ahmed, former Foreign Secretary Pakistan, writes 'Gen Musharraf made unprecedented but unreciprocated gestures of flexibility. He proposed four points out-of-box solution of the Kashmir ethnic regions, their demilitarization, self-rule and a joint mechanism. But none of his gestures elicited at least

⁶⁶ Baqir Sajjad Syed, National Command Authority calls for strategic restraint pact in S. Asia, *Dawn*, Feb 25, 2016. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1241802> (Accessed March 28, 2016.)

⁶⁷ Sandeep Dikshit, "Terrorism issue first, insisted India," *The Hindu*, July 16 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Terrorism-issue-first-insisted-India/article16198910.ece> (Accessed March 26, 2017.); "India insists NSA-level talks will only be on terrorism: Rajnath Singh" *The Indian Express*, August 22 2015. <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/india-insists-nsa-level-talks-will-only-be-on-terrorism-rajnath-singh/> (Accessed March 26, 2017); "India insists talks on terror instead of Kashmir: FO" *The Nation*, August 14, 2016. <http://nation.com.pk/international/14-Aug-2016/india-insists-talks-on-terror-instead-of-kashmir-fo> (Accessed March 26, 2017.)

⁶⁸ Kasuri, *Niether a Hawk, Nor a Dove*.

publically, any matching response from India.⁶⁹ Though, it is argued by many in Pakistan that Musharraf's proposal was a serious compromise on core national interests of Pakistan.

Another important development was the resumption of Composite Dialogue in 2004, when Indian PM Vajpayee visited Pakistan at the occasion of SAARC summit in Islamabad. Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Musharraf signed the agreement with a hope to reach 'peaceful resolution of all issues (including Kashmir)' through integrated composite dialogue.⁷⁰ Years 2007 and 2008 remained non-conducive for dialogue due terrorist attack on Samjhota Express⁷¹ (a passenger train service between India and Pakistan) and Mumbai attacks respectively. The peace process was immediately stalled by India in the aftermath of the Mumbai Attacks.

Modi, however adopted an aggressive approach and a policy of disengagement towards Pakistan became a norm.

In 2009, Prime Ministers of both countries Yousuf Raza Gillani and Manmohan Singh met at the side lines of Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Egypt at Sharm- el- Sheikh. In the Joint Statement, both leaders decided to revive the peace process and decided to delink the dialogue from 'action on terrorism'. While the progress on development of Mumbai attack investigations was discussed, Pakistan also raised the issue of Indian involvement in Pakistan's province of Baluchistan.⁷² It was an important development for the revival of peace process, but it was sabotaged by the Indian opposition's political pressure and media hype targeting Prime Minister Singh for delinking dialogue from taking action on terrorism and accepting the meddling of Indian intelligence agency in Balochistan.⁷³

On the sidelines of SAARC Summit 2010 held in Bhutan, the two Prime Ministers held one-on-one meeting. They agreed on the future

⁶⁹ Shamshad Ahmed, *Pakistan and World Affairs*, (Lahore: Jahangir Publishers, 2014)

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Samjhota Express was on its way back to Pakistan. Most of the passengers were Pakistani and 50 Pakistanis out of 68 passengers were died in the blasts exploded in the train, planned by Indian Hindu terrorists. See, "2007 Samjhauta blasts case: Four more witnesses turn hostile," *Indian Express*, December 24, 2016. <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/2007-samjhauta-blasts-case-four-more-witnesses-turn-hostile-4442543/> (Accessed Feb 20, 2017.)

⁷² Reuters, TEXT - India, Pakistan prime ministers' joint statement, Jul 16, 2009, accessed, March 18, 2016, <http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-41092220090716>

⁷³ Mahwish Hafeez, Pakistan-India Relations- the Peace Process, *Strategic Studies*, XXXI, no.3, (Autumn 2011) p.

interactions of foreign ministers and secretaries to set the future course of action. Following the agreement, the foreign ministers held their meeting. India insisted to make the terrorism central part of the discussions and maintained that there wasn't any need to resume the "Composite Dialogue"⁷⁴ and suggested to establish a new mechanism, for dialogue. Whereas, Pakistan stressed on the time bound talks on the core issues especially Kashmir and Siachen. Indian Foreign Minister S M Krishna indicated that terrorism was the main concern of India and that the talks on Kashmir could not be held unless the main concern was addressed.⁷⁵ Nevertheless in 2011, the composite dialogue resumed and there was some progress on economic relations.⁷⁶ In 2012, Pakistan's President Zardari undertook a private journey to India, ostensibly for visiting Ajmer shrine⁷⁷ availed the occasion to call on Indian Prime Minister. A comprehensive joint communique was issued that rekindled the hope for forward movement.⁷⁸ However, soon electoral hype in India overtook the events, BJP contested the election on anti-Pakistan, anti-China them.⁷⁹ Interestingly however, in Pakistan, almost all political parties had promised to improve relations with India during their 2013 electoral campaigns.⁸⁰

Prime Minister Sharif elected, third time, and through the general elections of 2013 has all along been inclined to develop good and friendly relations with India.⁸¹ As a good will gesture, he accepted the invitation of Indian government to attend the oath taking ceremony of Prime Minister Narendra Modi elected in 2014⁸² In spite of the general impression that the occasion was used by Modi to project himself as leader of South Asia. Soon after however Indian PM adopted

⁷⁴ Further details are discussed in the upcoming section.

⁷⁵ Sandeep Dikshit, "Terrorism issue first..."

⁷⁶ The progress has been explained under the section of "Economic Relations".

⁷⁷ "Asif Ali Zardari offers prayers at Ajmer Sharif, announces \$1 million," *The Times of India*, April 8, 2012. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Asif-Ali-Zardari-offers-prayers-at-Ajmer-Sharif-announces-1-million/articleshow/12582212.cms> (Accessed March 17, 2017.)

⁷⁸ "Prime Minister, Pak President make joint statement," *NDTV*, April 08, 2012. <http://www.ndtv.com/india-news/prime-minister-pak-president-make-joint-statement-475599> (Accessed March 17, 2017.)

⁷⁹ *Walter K. Andersen* "Bharatiya Janata Party: A. Victory for Narendra. Modi," chapter in *India's 2014 Elections: A Modi-led BJP Sweep*, edited by Paul Wallace, (New Delhi : SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2015): 49

⁸⁰ "A Comparative Analysis of Election Manifestoes of Major Political Parties" *PILDAT Report*, April 2013: http://www.pildat.org/publications/publication/elections/Election2013_ManifestoesComparison.pdf (Accessed March 20, 2017.)

⁸¹ "PM outlines foreign policy in broad strokes," *Dawn*, Jun 06, 2013. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1016464> (Accessed March 20, 2017.)

⁸² "Accepting PM Modi's Invite was 'Exceptional Decision,' Says Nawaz Sharif," *NDTV*, April 29, 2015. <http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/accepting-pm-modis-invite-was-exceptional-decision-says-nawaz-sharif-759150> (Accessed March 17, 2017.)

an aggressive approach and since then a policy of disengagement towards Pakistan became a norm. A record number of cease fire violations began at the LoC. Both countries routinely blame each other of initiating the firing against the other side.⁸³ The hawkish statements from the Indian Prime Minister and his cabinet ministers have added fuel to the fire and a rather India friendly regime in Pakistan had to backtrack from the flexible approach.⁸⁴

Though Prime Minister Modi also paid a surprise visit to Pakistan at the birthday of Prime Minister Sharif on December 25, 2015, but this could not help the rescheduling of secretary level talks which had by then been canceled by India twice⁸⁵ First these talks were canceled in 2014 due to flimsy Indian objection to the invitation of Kashmiri leadership at Pakistani High Commission in India ahead of the talks; such invitations had been a long established practice.⁸⁶ Secondly, after the Ufa Declaration, India once again alleged that the militants who attacked the Indian Air Force Station Pathankot belonged to the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) and demanded Pakistan to probe the matter. Pakistan's government condemned the attack and assured India to cooperate with Indian intelligence and security forces in this regard.⁸⁷ Again after Uri attack, the relations deteriorated further. Indian Army, in response to the attack claimed of having conducted the 'surgical strike' within Pakistani territory which was denied.⁸⁸ Indian Prime Minister also threatened Pakistan of abrogating IWT unilaterally.⁸⁹ So, the relations continue to move from bad to worse with the increase in tensions.

⁸³ Julia Thompson, "The Dynamics of Violence along the Kashmir Divide, 2003-2015," working paper by *Stimson Centre*, 2015, p. 2. <https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/dynamics-violence-kashmir-divide.pdf> (Accessed March 17, 2017.)

⁸⁴ Kamran Yousaf, "Modi's anti-Pakistan remarks 'regrettable': FO," *The Express Tribune*, June 9, 2015. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/900400/fo-should-take-note-of-modis-statements-against-pakistan-khursheed-shah/> (Accessed March 17, 2017.)

⁸⁵ "India-Pakistan talks cancelled amid recriminations,"

⁸⁶ Rama Lakshmi, "India cancels talks with Pakistan over tea invitation to Kashmiri separatists," *The Washington Post*, August 18, 2014. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/08/18/india-cancels-talks-with-pakistan-over-tea-invitation-to-kashmiri-separatists/> (Accessed April 6, 2016.)

⁸⁷ "Pakistan condemns Pathankot attack," *The Express Tribune*, January 3, 2016. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/1021053/pakistan-condemns-pathankot-attack/> (Accessed March 17, 2017.)

⁸⁸ See further details under the heading, "Military and Strategic Relations"

⁸⁹ See further details under the heading "Water Issues: The possibility of Water Wars?"

Since, India has adopted an aggressive policy on the basis of the incidents discussed above, there doesn't seem any hope of resumption of the peace process any time soon.

The Composite Dialogue: A Stand Still? The composite dialogue was initiated in 1985 but the process was subject to stalemate in 1990. Later in 1997, the leadership of both the countries decided to restart the process on eight agenda points (Peace and Security, Kashmir, Siachen Glacier, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation project, Sir Creek, Economic and Commercial Cooperation, Terrorism and Drug trafficking, Promotion of friendly exchanges in various fields.) But due to nuclear tests in 1998, Kargil Crisis and the 2001 parliament attack, it could only resumed in 2004.⁹⁰ Four rounds of talks under the ambit of Composite Dialogue were held from 2004-2008; later two rounds were held in 2011 -2012. Though during the process, some CBMs⁹¹ were instituted but their implementation fell prey to political tensions. For example in 2005, both sides reached an agreement on the "establishment of hotline" between Pakistan Maritime Security Agency" and "Indian Coast Guards" for exchange of information about the fishermen of each country entering into the territory of the other country, presumably by mistake, leading to the imprisonment of alien fishermen by both sides.⁹² Nevertheless, this has not altered the plight of hapless fishermen. As a matter of routine, hundreds of fishermen rot in the jails of both sides, allegedly crossing the maritime borders illegally. They suffer still more when the tensions between the two countries are high.⁹³ In 2006, a bus service was started from Lahore to Amritsar but it was suspended in the aftermath of 2008 Mumbai attack.⁹⁴

Thus the process has remained without any substantive outcome on any of the eight agenda points.⁹⁵ Former Pakistani ambassador Masood Khan puts it, "it is not a process at all because it

⁹⁰ Aymen Ijaz, "Analysis Of Pak-India Composite Dialogue," *Pakistan Observer*, September 15, 2015 <http://www.ipripak.org/analysis-of-pak-india-composite-dialogue/> (Accessed March 21, 2017.)

⁹¹ For further details see, "South Asia Confidence-Building Measures (CBM) Timeline" available at: <http://www.stimson.org/content/south-asia-confidence-building-measures-cbm-timeline-0>

⁹² Sandeep Dikshit, Partial solution or a step forward?, *The Hindu*, October 05, 2005, March 31, 2016. <http://www.thehindu.com/2005/10/05/stories/2005100508631400.htm> (Accessed March 04, 2017.)

⁹³ Ayesha Tanzeem, Fishermen Face Brunt of India Pakistan Tensions, *Voice of America*, March 15, 2016. <http://www.voanews.com/a/fishermen-face-brunt-tensions-india-pakistan/3239041.html> (Accessed March 17, 2017.)

⁹⁴ V. Bruce J. Tolentino, At the India-Pakistan Border: History, Replayed Daily, May 27, 2009. <http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2009/05/27/at-the-india-pakistan-border-history-replayed-daily/> (Accessed March 31, 2016.)

⁹⁵ Masood Khan, "Rethink Composite Dialogue" *Pakistan Observer*

has always been dialogue about dialogue and it has sputtered more often than it has worked.⁹⁶

The fragility of peace process is not only reflected by the suspension of the dialogue but also the fact that when the dialogue is held, it is by no means easy for the two countries to arrive at a joint outcome document. In some of the secretary level talks held in recent years, the sides could not agree on a joint press release, and hence none was issued; with both secretaries addressing separate press conferences.

In December 2015, both countries decided to resume the peace process as Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue instead of Composite Dialogue, during the visit of Indian Foreign Minister Sushma Swaraj to Pakistan⁹⁸, yet, dialogue is still to resume even under the new title. Peace process would come true only when there is political will to resolve the key issues.

So far the track II approach between the two countries has failed to bring about any desired results.

Track Two Initiatives: Track II initiatives are the unofficial policy oriented dialogues aimed at facilitating the conflict resolution efforts and negotiations at official level. These dialogues usually involve retired government officials, ex-military men, diplomats, policy analysts etc. Some famous initiatives IN CASE OF India and Pakistan include: Neemrana dialogue, Balusa Group, Ottawa Dialogue, The Chaophraya Dialogue, Pugwash Conferences, Track Two Workshops by Regional Center for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Pakistan India People's Forum for Peace and Democracy (PIPFPD), and the Women in Security, Conflict Management and Peace (WISCOMP) annual workshop etc.⁹⁹ So far the

⁹⁶ Opening Remarks by Ambassador Masood Khan, Director General Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad (ISSI) on the occasion of the launch of Indian Grand Strategy - Machiavellian or Kautilyan, organized jointly by the Institute of Regional Studies and the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. September 29, 2015.

⁹⁸ "Composite dialogue goes comprehensive" *The Nation*, December 10, 2015. <http://nation.com.pk/national/10-Dec-2015/composite-dialogue-goes-comprehensive> (Accessed April 7, 2016.)

⁹⁹ Samir Ahmad, Track-Two Dialogue in the India-Pakistan Context, ISAS Brief no. 408, February 23, 2016. <http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/ISAS%20Reports/ISAS%20Brief%20No.%20408.%20Track-Two%20Dialogue%20in%20the%20India-Pakistan%20Context.pdf> (Accessed April 4, 2016); Rachel Goldberg, "Track Two Diplomacy in India and Pakistan Initiatives, Impact, Challenges, and Ways Forward" *Praid Policy Journal*, Volume 1, Issue 2, July 2013. http://www.priad.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/PRIAD_POLICYJOURNAL_Goldberg2.pdf (Accessed February 9, 2017.)

track II approach between the two countries has failed to bring about any desired results.

People to People Contacts: When Composite Dialogue resumed in 2004, the promotion of people to people contacts was included in agenda. As a refreshing change, such contacts did flourish during the four rounds of composite dialogues held between 2004- 2008. This included exchange visits involving: members from Academia, media, business community, judiciary and the showbiz. Pakistan and India also have a "Cultural Agreement" in place since 1988. However, restrictive visa regimes between the two countries remained a major hurdle in accelerating people to people contacts. In 2012, the two sides agreed to relax the visa regime applying on the travel through international border excluding the travel across LoC; the revised regime still awaits implementation.¹⁰⁰

The situation has worsened particularly during last couple of years. Even Prominent Pakistanis were discouraged to visit India by the extremist elements there. In 2015, Former foreign Minister Khurshid Mehmud Kasuri visited India on the launch of his book and the organizer of the event was manhandled by the extremists—his face was painted blue by throwing ink at him; same year, Indian Journalist Burkha Dutt and former Indian foreign Minister Salman Khurshid launched their books in Pakistan, these events went quite smoothly.¹⁰¹ Bilateral cricket was canceled by India in 2015 due to the protests of Hindu extremist Party Shiv Sena—a protégé of ruling BJP.¹⁰² Pakistan had to think twice before sending its cricket team to India for T20 World Cup 2016, as some elements in India threatened that they wouldn't let the match of Pakistani team happen.¹⁰³

The hawkish reporting of India media is one of the factors that has made India a hostile ground for Pakistani artists, sportsmen and politicians etc. John Briscoe, a former World Bank's water expert, writes his experience of observing the media of the two countries:

¹⁰⁰ Rashid Ahmad Khan, "Friendly Exchanges and People-to-People Contact Between Pakistan and India: Imperatives and Impediments" *Strategic Studies*

¹⁰¹ Saher Baloch, "Barkha, Salman see 'uncertain' future for India's Congress party," *Dawn*, Feb 07, 2016. <http://www.dawn.com/news/1237971> (Accessed April 7, 2016.)

¹⁰² "Shiv Sena attack derails India-Pakistan cricket talks," *BBC*, October 19, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-34569574> (Accessed April 7, 2016.)

¹⁰³ Nick Hault, "World T20 chaos as Pakistan reject venue for India game," *The Telegraph*, March 8, 2016. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/cricket/2016/03/08/world-t20-chaos-as-pakistan-reject-venue-for-india-game/> (Accessed April 7, 2016.)

“Living in Delhi and working in both India and Pakistan, I was struck by a paradox. One country was a vigorous democracy, the other a military regime. But whereas an important part of the Pakistani press regularly reported India's views on the water issue in an objective way, the Indian press never did the same. I never saw a report which gave

Political rivalry has not only affected economic relations but it has been reflected in negative tactics in economic competition else-where.

Indian readers a factual description of the enormous vulnerability of Pakistan, of the way in which India had socked it to Pakistan when filling Baglihar. How could this be, I asked? Because, a journalist colleague in Delhi told me, "when it comes to Kashmir – and the Indus Treaty is considered an integral part of Kashmir -- the ministry of

external affairs instructs newspapers on what they can and cannot say, and often tells them explicitly what it is they are to say”.¹⁰⁴

Such pattern of reporting shows that hatred among masses is inculcated by employing media as a tool.

Economic Relations: Pakistan-India has an immense potential of bilateral trade which is estimated around \$ 25 billion.¹⁰⁵ With the dawn of twenty first century, the economic relations between the two countries saw a new hope. The trade volume increased gradually, though in India's favour.¹⁰⁶ Though, post 2000s trade between India and Pakistan has sustained and gradually increased, but the trade volume is still less than \$ 3 billion.¹⁰⁷ In 1995, India granted Pakistan MFN status which is not reciprocated by Pakistan for concerns including tariff and non-tariff barriers embedded in Indian trade policy.

Despite the optimism of the proponents of economic interdependence,¹⁰⁸ the history of Pakistan India relations proves that despite the relatively better economic relations till early 1960s, the

¹⁰⁴ John Briscoe, "War or peace on the Indus?" *The News International*, April 03, 2010.

http://johnbriscoe.seas.harvard.edu/files/johnbriscoe/files/108_john_briscoe_war_or_peace_on_the_indus_201004.pdf (Accessed February 13, 2017.)

¹⁰⁵ Nisha Taneja, "Additional Trade Challenges: Transport, Transit, and Non-Tariff Barriers" in *Pakistan-India Trade: What Needs to be Done, What Does it Matter*, (Wilson Centre, Washington DC, 2013):1.

¹⁰⁶ Ghuman & Madaan, "Indo-Pakistan Trade"

¹⁰⁷ Michael Kugelman, "The Pakistan-India Trade Relationship: Prospects, Profits, and Pitfalls" in Op. Cit. *Pakistan-India Trade*: 1.

¹⁰⁸ Josefine Pernes & Ulrika Möller, "Coming Together over Trade? A Study of the Resumed Dialogue between India and Pakistan," *Asian Security*, 10 no.3, (2014) p. 224.

trade could not provide the two states a sufficient reason to abstain from going to war. The economic relations were often suspended due to political and military tensions.

Political rivalry has not only affected economic relations but it has been reflected in negative tactics in economic competition elsewhere. Post 2000s, several moves of India to blow the already struggling economy of Pakistan created concerns in Pakistan that India not only wants to weaken Pakistan politically but also economically. Pakistan's economy suffered severely in the back drop of its support for Global War on Terror. To support the economy of Pakistan a concessionary package was offered by European Union (EU) to Pakistani exporters in 2002, which was opposed by India. New Dehli repeated such hostility in 2010, when natural calamity of heavy floods hit Pakistan and resulted in huge loss of lives, infrastructures and crops. To offset this loss, the EU once again offered a package for economic assistance to Pakistan, and was sent to World Trade Organization for a waiver. India again objected to the waiver as it was presented in WTO. It was conveyed to Pakistan by the EU that unless India approves the waiver, it could not be taken to WTO, again.¹⁰⁹ Such hostile moves by India have contributed a lot in aggravating Pakistan's concerns in the context of economic relations with India.¹¹⁰

At the composite dialogue level, when India decided to end the objection of WTO waiver for Pakistan, Pakistan also started considering of granting India the MFN status. In 2012, Indian Commerce Minister visited Pakistan and Pakistan's Commerce Minister visited India in 2014. The two sides agreed to 'keep the Wagah – Attari Land Customs Station operational on all seven days of each week' and to 'provide Non-Discriminatory Market Access (NDMA), on a reciprocal basis.'¹¹¹ Yet again, due to lack of agreement on operational level details, both parties could not move forward.

India's eagerness to get access to CARs is underlying reason for India's selective emphasis on strengthening and negotiating trade with Pakistan via land route, while avoiding talking on core political issues including Kashmir. India has concerns over Pakistan's reluctance to provide NDMA to India whereas Pakistan has concerns over Non-tariff

¹⁰⁹ Zafar Mehmood, *Moving Towards Pakistan India Trade Normalization*, " in Op. Cit. *Pakistan-India Trade*: 21-23

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Joint Press Statement of the Commerce Ministers of India and Pakistan, 18-January-2014, Government of India Ministry of Commerce & Industry. <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=102587> (Accessed March 25, 2016.)

barriers (NTBs)¹¹² in India's import regime which ensure that trade balance remains in India's favor. The existing trade volume between India and Pakistan does indicate the same pattern of trade imbalance. India has more stringent imports regulatory and visa regimes than Pakistan.¹¹³ Substantial agriculture subsidies in India are also a factor of cheap products which are difficult to compete by Pakistani products. The Indian concern over MFN and Pakistani exporters' concern over obstacles in Indian markets could be addressed on reciprocal bases in composite or comprehensive dialogue, but, there is uncertainty of the commencement of dialogue as well as the fruitfulness of the process.

In the recent episodes of political tension, India has articulated the intent of withdrawing the MFN status to Pakistan.¹¹⁴ It simply proves that economic relations are dependent on political relations and the real potential can only be tapped smoothly in the absence of core conflicts.

Allegation of Terrorism: The question of Transparency: Post 9/11 the issue of terrorism has become a matter of grave concern in Pak-India relations. India has, since then, waged a diplomatic warfare against Pakistan in international community by attaching a tag of a terror sponsoring state. Benefiting from the international environment as a consequence of narrative on terrorism, India has tried to exploit each and every opportunity to malign Pakistan. It has resorted to false flag operations for staging the events and blaming it on Pakistan. The most significant example in this regard is the so-called 2001 attack on Indian parliament. India was quick to blame Pakistan within hours of occurrence. However, lack of transparency in internal investigation and the indecent haste in executing the sole surviving convict, Afzal Guru, dubbed as "Master Mind" raised many questions about the accuracy of Indian claims concerning the origin of attack and actual persona of attackers.¹¹⁵ Later, in an interesting development, an official of Central Bureau of Investigation accepted that the attack was perpetrated by the government "with the objective of strengthening the counter-terror legislation (sic)".¹¹⁶

¹¹² "Any measure other than high import duties (tariffs) employed to restrict imports."

¹¹³ "Pakistan-India Trade Normalization: A word of Caution," report published by *Pakistan Business Council*, (2015): 10-13.

¹¹⁴ "Withdrawal of Most Favored Nation status may hurt Pakistan industry: Experts," *Times of India*, Sep 27, 2016. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Withdrawal-of-Most-Favoured-Nation-status-may-hurt-Pakistan-industry-Experts/articleshow/54552083.cms> (Accessed March 21, 2017.)

¹¹⁵ Arundhati Roy, *Field Notes on Democracy*, 103-106.

¹¹⁶ "Govt behind Parliament attack, 26/11: Ishrat probe officer", *Times of India*, July 14, 2013. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Govt-behind-Parliament-attack-26/11-Ishrat-probe-officer/articleshow/21062116.cms> (Accessed May 10, 2016.)

On the contrary, in case of attack on Samjhota Express, Pakistan's government showed restraint by not suspending the talks despite the death of 50 Pakistanis out of 68 passengers who died in the incident.¹¹⁷ Interestingly, the initial allegations by India were made against some outfits which had a Pakistan connection.¹¹⁸ Later on in 2011, a confessional statement before an Indian court by an Indian, Swami Assemanand, member of Hindu Nationalist Party Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) revealed that the blasts of Samjhota Express were perpetrated by Hindu terrorists but several other incidents were planned and executed by RSS functionaries assisted by a serving senior Indian military officer— Colonel Prohit. In his 42 pages confessional statement, he accepted:

"I suggested that the 80% of the people of Malegaon were Muslim and we should explode the first bomb in Malegaon itself. I also said that during the partition the Nizam of Hyderabad has wanted to go with Pakistan so Hyderabad was a fair target. Then I said that since Hindus also through the Ajmer Sharif Dargah in large numbers we should also explode a bomb which would deter the Hindus from going there. I also suggested the Aligarh Muslim University as a terror target.....Joshi suggested that it was basically Pakistanis who travel on Samjhota Express train....we should attack the train as well....Joshi took responsibility for targeting Samjhota himself".¹¹⁹

Ironically, Assemanand was released on bail in 2014, and the Indian government didn't challenge his bail petition. Booking innocent Muslims for the terrorist attacks, and protecting actual Hindutva terrorists from legal consequences has been the trend in Indian procedures of probing terrorism cases. The witnesses in both these cases turned hostile in 2014 after Modi government took charge. The Indian government is well known for protecting the saffron interests.¹²⁰

Notwithstanding the lack of transparency in legal procedures during investigation of Parliament and Samjhota and other attacks, India has been going overboard in expressing anger against Pakistan for not taking appropriate action against Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, the alleged mastermind of Mumbai Attacks. Lakhvi was arrested in 2008 and was released in 2015 by the Pakistani court due to lack of evidence, which was to be provided by the government of India. Later,

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Saleem Zafar & Awais Bin Wasi, "Terrorism in India".

¹¹⁹ Ashish Khetan, "In the words of a Zealot," *Tehelka*, issue 2 Vol. 8 January 15, 2011, <http://www.tehelka.com/2011/01/in-the-words-of-a-zealot/?singlepage=1> (Accessed May 11, 2016.)

¹²⁰ Latha Jishnu, "Terrorism's saffron fault line," *Dawn*, July 27, 2015, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1196556> (Accessed, May 11, 2016):

well separated in time and space, two other attacks of low intensity occurred in Gurdaspur (2015) and in Pathan Kot (2016). India was again quick to blame Pakistan. Again accusations were made against Jaish e Muhammed (JeM) based in Pakistan, when Pakistan's investigation team visited India to probe Pathan Kot incident, the team was disappointed to see the patchy evidence presented by Indian investigators. Pakistani investigators also suspected the murder of Muslim officer of National Investigation Agency (NIA) team of Pathan Kot probe, during their visit.¹²¹ Soon after there was a statement by head of Indian Punjab police that there wasn't enough evidence leading to foreign involvement and that there was insider support provided by a senior police officer.¹²²

Pakistan also blames Indian Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) for sponsoring terrorist activities in Pakistan. Islamabad insists that it has irrefutable evidence regarding involvement of Indian operatives for supporting insurgency in Baluchistan, Karachi and other areas. It was agreed by the Indian Prime Minister at Sherm Ul Sheikh that Indian involvement in Baluchistan would be investigated¹²³; it never was. In the year 2015, the representative of a Baluchistan Liberation Army, a terrorist organization in Pakistan, has surfaced in India, he frequently addresses selective gathering to exploit anti- Pakistan sentiments for gaining support for his organization's separatist activities in Baluchistan.¹²⁴ There have been confessions with regard to such involvement at state level as well; for example, addressing in a university in India, Ajit Doval, Indian National Security Advisor, accepted that the Indian Intelligence agencies were in contact with terrorists operating against Pakistan.¹²⁵ Open acclamation of India's role in separation of West Pakistan from East Pakistan, by Prime Minister Modi during his 2015 visit to Bangladesh has re-scratched the old

¹²¹ Record of the Press Briefing by Spokesperson on 25 February 2016, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan <http://www.mofa.gov.pk/pr-details.php?mm=MzQ5NQ> (Accessed March 18, 2016.)

¹²² "No evidence of Pakistan's involvement in Pathankot attack: Indian NIA chief," *Dawn*, June 2, 2016. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1262304/no-evidence-of-pakistans-involvement-in-pathankot-attack-indian-nia-chief> (Accessed, March 21, 2017.)

¹²³ Bharat Bhushan, "Manmohan Singh's Balochistan Blunder" *India Today*, July 20, 2009. <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/Mammohan+Singhs+Balochistan+blunder/1/52519.html> (Accessed, February 13, 2017.)

¹²⁴ Kallol Bhattacharjee & Suhasini Haidar, "After PoK, India turns focus on Balochistan," *The Hindu*, October 8, 2015. <http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/after-pok-india-turns-focus-on-balochistan/article7735545.ece> (Accessed, March 20, 2017.)

¹²⁵ "Doval Offensive Defense Theory" Video at *Daily Motion*, January, 1, 2015. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x2du5ae_doval-s-defensive-offense-theory_news (Accessed, March 20, 2017.)

wounds amongst people of Pakistan.¹²⁶ While India accepts Jadhav as a former naval officer, it denies his role as a RAW agent. Islamabad however claims that Jadhav is an in-service Indian Navy officer who was working for RAW. Initial investigations revealed that he was working on a special task of sabotaging the CPEC and had links with Baloch separatists as well as Afghan National Directorate of Intelligence (NDI).¹²⁷ He was permanently based in Iran under the cover of being part of Indian team working for uplift of Chabahar port. Under the current regime, India has switched over its previous policy of extending only covert support to giving an all-out overt support to terrorist entities operating in anti-state role as well as terrorists of ethno-sectarian shade with the objective of keeping Pakistan off balanced. This conclusion is supported by the occurrence that during his Independence Day address of August 15, 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi publically encouraged separatist elements operating in Gilgit-Baltistan and Baluchistan.¹²⁸ Pakistan has twice presented dossiers in the United Nations containing essential evidence of Indian involvement in destabilizing Pakistan. However, there remains complete denial from India in case of Pakistan's assertions of Indian involvement in fermenting terror in Pakistani territory; while India continues to demand action from Pakistani side.

Water Issues: The possibility of Water Wars? Entire quantum of water assigned for usage by Pakistan, as per the World Bank guaranteed arrangement, under Indus Water Treaty (IWT) flows from Indian Occupied Kashmir. There are issues related to the implementation of IWT which fall in the category of core issues between India and Pakistan. When IWT was negotiated, the aspect of hydro power generation was anticipated and India was permitted to do so by constructing run-of the river projects; however, with the passage of time India has started building water storage based electricity generation facilities. Such power projects are violation of the treaty and give India control over the flow of rivers assigned to Pakistan under IWT.¹²⁹ John Briscoe(late), an expert on water issues between India

¹²⁶ Kamran Yousaf, "Modi's anti-Pakistan remarks 'regrettable': FO," *The Express Tribune*, June 9, 2015. <https://tribune.com.pk/story/900400/fo-should-take-note-of-modis-statements-against-pakistan-khursheed-shah/> (Accessed March 12, 2017.)

¹²⁷ "Arrest of Kulbhushan 'unconventional war' against Pakistan: Gen Riaz" *The News International*, August 12, 2016, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/142020-Arrest-of-Kulbhushan-unconventional-war-against-Pakistan-Gen-Riaz#> (Accessed, February 13, 2017.)

¹²⁸ "Narendra Modi's speech on Independence Day 2016: Here's the full text," *The Indian Express*, August 15, 2016. <http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pm-narendra-modis-speech-on-independence-day-2016-here-is-the-full-text/> (Accessed March 28, 2017.)

¹²⁹ Kari Lipschutz, *Global Insider: The India-Pakistan Water Dispute*, an e-mail interview with John Briscoe, Former

and Pakistan, maintains that 'if India builds all its planned projects, it could have the capacity of holding up about a month's worth of river flow during Pakistan's critical dry season, enough to wreck an entire planting season.'¹³⁰

Realizing the threat to its water security leading to economic security, Pakistan took the matter of India's Baglihar hydro-power Plant and Kishenganga Hydro Power Plant, to the World Bank as both the states couldn't resolve the issue bilaterally. A conflict resolution

Despite passing of over a dozen resolutions on Kashmir, UNSC has failed to resolve the dispute.

mechanism was established under the IWT. The verdict of Kishenganga case verdict supports Pakistan's point of view and India has been barred from opening the dams' gates below the level of river bed even for flushing the silt deposition.¹³¹ Pakistan has also to taken up the case of Ratle Hydro-

Power plant with the World Bank.¹³²

Moving a step further from planning and construction of Hydro Power Plants on LoC, Indian Prime Minister has recently threatened Pakistan to stop the water flow to Pakistan by revoking the treaty, unilaterally. Pakistan's foreign affairs advisor responded that it would be taken as an 'act of war'.¹³³ However the Indian PM was soon to eat his words under World Bank pressure and commissioner level talks had to be resumed at Lahore on March 21-23.¹³⁴ Considering the severity of the water issues, the possibility of water war between the two

World Bank Senior Water Advisor, July 10, 2010.

<http://worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/5756/global-insider-the-india-pakistan-water-dispute>[6/10/2010 (Accessed February 13, 2017.)

¹³⁰ Lydia Polgreen & Sabrina Tavernise, "Water Dispute Increases India-Pakistan Tension" *The New York Times*, July 10, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/asia/21kashmir.html?_r=1 (Accessed February 13, 2017.)

¹³¹ John Briscoe, "Winning the battle but losing the war," *The Hindu*, February 22, 2013. <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/winning-the-battle-but-losing-the-war/article4439676.ece> (Accessed March 28, 2017.)

¹³² Zofeen T. Ebrahim & Joydeep Gupta, "India resists World Bank move to resolve Indus Water Treaty dispute," *Dawn*, Jan 06, 2017. <https://www.dawn.com/news/1306778> (Accessed March 21, 2017.)

¹³³ Michael Kugelman, "Why the India-Pakistan War Over Water Is So Dangerous" *Foreign Policy*, September 30, 2016. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/30/why-the-india-pakistan-war-over-water-is-so-dangerous-indus-waters-treaty/> (Accessed February 13, 2017.)

¹³⁴ Mian Ahmad Naeem Salik, "A New Round of Water Talks Between Pakistan - India," *ISSI Issue Brief*, March 28, 2017. http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Final_IB_Ahmad_Salik_dated_28-03-2017.pdf (Accessed March 28, 2017.)

countries, looms large. Being the facilitator of the treaty, World Bank should take the responsibility to mediate and try to settle the emerging issues in the light of IWT.

Resolution of Kashmir: A matter of Urgency: Along with several UNSC Resolutions on Kashmir, Resolution 1172 of the UN Security Council adopted in 1998 in the aftermath of nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan respectively, is the most recent resolution which calls for the resolution of Kashmir dispute. It "urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on all outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security, in order to remove the tensions between them, and encourages them to find mutually acceptable solutions that address the root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir."¹³⁵ This is the most recent UN resolution which denies the Indian claim of considering Kashmir as an integral part.¹³⁶

It is pity that despite passing of over a dozen resolutions on Kashmir, UNSC has failed to resolve the dispute. It appears that no action could be taken against the violators of UNSC unless the interests of powerful five permanent members (P-5) are at stake. If international community has serious concerns on eruption of a nuclear war in South Asia, they have to play their part for implementation of these resolutions. Kashmir is not only a territorial dispute, it has taken other dimensions as well. The matter now falls under "International Humanitarian Law".¹³⁷ It has become an issue of human rights violations by India, testified by all leading international human rights organizations; it is the matter of forced occupation against the will of people; it is also the matter of war crimes committed by Indian occupation forces.¹³⁸ Alongside the ethnic cleansing of Kashmiri Muslims through systematic genocide, demographic changes have been initiated

¹³⁵ RESOLUTION 1172 (1998), Adopted by the Security Council at its 3890th meeting on 6 June 1998, available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/naruhodo/data/pdf/data6-1.pdf/>

¹³⁶ See "Resolution 1172" attached in Annexure.

¹³⁷ "Developments in Kashmir: Dynamics and the Way Forward- Seminar Recommendations" Institute of Policy Studies, Accessed March 28, 2017, <http://www.ips.org.pk/security-and-foreign-policy/2036-developments-in-kashmir-dynamics-and-the-way-forward>

¹³⁸ For Details see, "DENIED' Failures in accountability for human rights violations by security force personnel in Jammu and Kashmir" report published by *Amnesty International*, 2015 available at, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA2018742015ENGLISH.PDF>; "Everyone Lives in Fear"

Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir," *Human Rights Watch*, Volume 18, No. 11(C). 2006, available at <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/india0906/> ; "The Human Rights Crisis In Kashmir" report published by *Human Rights Watch*, June 1993, available at <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/INDIA937.PDF>

by settling the non-Kashmiris in the disputed territory¹³⁹, thus violating the bilateral Simla Agreement by unilaterally altering the situation. It is this dispute which is also intricately linked with the water issues between the two states as well as with the Siachen dispute. Hence, there is a need of urgent international mediation as both countries have failed to reach a consensus on the issue, bilaterally. Here, it requires a proactive role of UN and the permanent members of Security Council to play their part to ensure the right of self-determination of Kashmiri People.

Conclusions

Being the two major regional powers in South Asia, both the states could contribute for the socio-economic development of the region but the hostility between the two kept the region devoid of its potential development and progress. This is the reason that it is least integrated region of the world as South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has remained hostage to this hostility. In a conference in Carnegie International, Khalid Kidwai stated it as: 'How can sustained socioeconomic progress come about if the threat of outstanding conflict, tension and recrimination hangs permanently in the air when eyeball to eyeball stance with nuclear weapons in the background?'¹⁴⁰

The resolution of the Kashmir dispute is the key for the sustainability of peace in South Asia. Stressing the two states to resolve the issue bilaterally, has not and will not bring any conclusive result. Alternatively, the third-party mediation becomes the need of the hour. UN resolutions have time and again called for the plebiscite and the peaceful resolution of the dispute. Since the resolutions are not self-executioner instruments, all permanent members of Security Council owe the responsibility to persuade India to respect the UN resolutions. Meanwhile, the issue of gross human rights violations also need to be addressed in accordance with the international humanitarian law.

To make the environment conducive for cooperation, India being the bigger player in the region, should behave responsibly and should try to minimize the level of threat perception in Pakistan

¹³⁹ "India plotting to change demography of J&K: Yasin Malik," *The Nation*, December 24, 2016, <http://nation.com.pk/national/24-Dec-2016/india-plotting-to-change-demography-of-j-k-yasin-malik> (Accessed March 11, 2017.)

¹⁴⁰ "A Conversation With Gen. Khalid Kidwai"

emanating from India. M K Bhadrakumar, former Indian diplomat writes, 'the hallmark of a responsible regional power is the capacity to douse tensions rather than queer the pitch of tensions that may affect regional security and stability.'¹⁴¹ India has to leave the policy of Pakistan's encirclement by either encouraging the smaller neighboring states to adopt anti-Pakistan approach, which is quite obvious in its relations with Afghanistan¹⁴² and Bangladesh, or influencing smaller neighbors to follow Indian approach in forums like SAARC. It should be realized that India cannot exert the same level of influence and hegemony over Pakistan as it does in case of other smaller South Asian states. It should be realized that the employment of Hindutva Slogan and the consequent treatment of minorities in India and scourging Pakistan to harvest political gains at domestic level, is not in the benefit of the people of any of the states and only helps in worsening the already hostile environment. The politics in India is overwhelmed with untenable anti-Pakistan rhetoric. Especially, portraying Pakistan as the supporter of terrorism has not only been the part of India's diplomacy at international level but this perception has also been strengthened within India through media and politics.

The future trajectory of Pakistan- India relations doesn't seem to be smooth. Though, there has been a marginal increase in trade volume, uncertainty clouds the environment; it has been and it can be subjected to disruptions due to any future crisis. Though the chances of war are reasonably curtailed with the deterrence stability brought in by nuclear weapons, continuous modernization of Indian conventional and strategic capabilities is likely to trigger strategic arms race in South Asia. Hence, the probability of war may not diminish altogether. Economic integration, infrastructure connectivity and strategic hostility cannot go along simultaneously and that too in the presence of core conflicts.

There is a strong domestic politics dimension to the whole issue which would continue to influence the relations between the two countries. The recent victory of BJP in Uttar Pradesh¹⁴³, indicate that Modi is likely to continue his aggressive approach towards Pakistan, to influence the domestic politics in his bid for getting second term in the

¹⁴¹ M K Bhadrakumar, "India should choose words carefully apropos Afghan-Pak tensions," *Rediff Blogs*, March 9, 2017 <http://blogs.rediff.com/mkbhadrakumar/2017/03/09/india-should-choose-words-carefully-apropos-afghan-pak-tensions/> (Accessed March 21, 2017.)

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Nilanjan Mukhopadhyay, "BJP's Uttar Pradesh win: A turning point for Modi?" *Al Jazeera*, March 12, 2017. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/03/bjp-uttar-pradesh-win-turning-point-modi-170312142735789.html> (Accessed March 29, 2017.)

next general elections in 2019. Nevertheless, in an optimistic scenario, when so many voices are being raised even in India¹⁴⁴, there could be possibility of changing the status quo, as the leadership in India with the background like Modi, known as and trusted for Hindu nationalistic approach could take the bold step of breaking the impasse in negotiations on all issues including Kashmir. This would however require an innovative approach by both Pakistan and India.

Moreover, the emerging strategic environment in the region may further worsen the rivalries. India's strengthening strategic Partnership with US has triggered clash of interests in the region. This partnership is likely to grow, consequently, making the region more volatile. On the other hand, the Strategic Restraint Regime proposed by Pakistan should be considered by India; and US should play its role in evolving such a regime and should ensure that any of its engagement in South Asia should not erode the deterrence stability in the region.

It is true that Emergence of prosperous and peaceful South Asia depends on a resolution of disputes between India and Pakistan. The conflict resolution between two states would lead to tremendous opportunities of socio- economic progress and regional integration. Meanwhile, there should be restraints in the development of strategic and conventional capabilities. Despite the fact that the trajectory of past seventy years has never been encouraging, and the tensions in recent years have sabotaged the efforts made in past towards normalization of the relations, there remains no other option other than continuing the efforts for resolution of disputes and promotion of peace at bilateral, multilateral and institutional level.

¹⁴⁴ Jean Drèze, "The new abnormal in Kashmir," *The Hindu*, December 25, 2016, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/The-new-abnormal-in-Kashmir/article16695599.ece?homepage=true> (Accessed March 19, 2017); Samar Halarnkar, "Can Modi discard policy that has brutalised Kashmir?" *Hindustan Times*, August 25, 2016 <http://www.hindustantimes.com/columns/can-modi-discard-policy-that-has-brutalised-kashmir/story-83TxanHxGXqV0Maxya7GOK.html> (Accessed March 19, 2017.)

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